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Introduction
Is a jury system necessary or even ideal in a country? From an Ameri-
can perspective, the answer would appear to be “yes.”  For example, in
American jurisprudence, the right to a trial by a lay jury in serious crimi-
nal cases and many civil cases is a fundamental constitutional right.1  A lay
jury is also common in many Western countries, particularly those coun-
tries with Anglo-Saxon roots.2  However, a jury system may not be ideal in
many countries, particularly those with heterogeneous populations, due in
part to both discrimination and to difficulties in reaching a consensus on a
common set of applicable laws.3  With numerous countries having already
instituted a lay jury system,4 it is important to determine when a lay jury
system is preferable.
Israel is a heterogeneous democracy that does not have a lay jury sys-
tem.5  In this Note, Israel is used as a case study to determine the appropri-
ate framework for deciding when a heterogeneous country should institute
a lay jury system.
This Note argues that there are two important prerequisites to the use
of a lay jury system in a heterogeneous country.  First, the vast majority of
citizens should have a common national identity.  Second, the society must
agree on a common set of laws to be employed.  In Part I, this Note gives
background information on jury systems both in the United States and
around the world in order to provide a foundation to compare Israel to the
countries that use a jury system.  In Part II, this Note discusses both the
Israeli legal system and the currently-existing internal social cleavages
within Israel.  In Part III, this Note argues that Israel should not move
toward a lay jury system because such a system would not be fair, particu-
larly to minority groups.  In Part IV, this Note develops a concise test for
whether and when a heterogeneous country should institute a lay jury
system.
I. Background on the Spread of the Anglo-Saxon Jury System Around
the World
A. Principles of the American Jury System
In the United States, the right to a trial by jury is synonymous with
American democracy.6  In fact, three of the Amendments in the Bill of
Rights pertain specifically to the trial by jury right.7  In criminal cases, the
Fifth Amendment protects criminal defendants by requiring that they be
1. See infra notes 6– 20 and accompanying text. R
2. See infra notes 24– 25 and accompanying text. R
3. See infra notes 32– 37 and accompanying text. R
4. See infra notes 24– 25 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra notes 47, 87, 92– 93 and accompanying text. R
6. See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986) (“The right to a
trial by jury is deeply embedded in the American democratic ethos.”).
7. See id.
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indicted by a Grand Jury for any “capital, or otherwise infamous crime.”8
The Sixth Amendment specifies that criminal defendants are entitled to a
“public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed.”9  The Seventh Amendment extends the
trial by jury right to civil cases.10
The United States, along with many other Western countries, adopted
the British common law jury system.11  However, the American legal sys-
tem utilizes juries more than the legal systems of Great Britain and
Canada.12  While the right to a jury in the United States is a constitutional
right, William Blackstone, a leading eighteenth century scholar of law,
argued that a trial by jury is a privilege, and is not a right within English
law.13
Currently, one basic feature of the American jury system is the right to
a jury venire14 that represents a fair cross-section of the community.  Ini-
tially, the American jury system included some discriminatory features
inherited from the British jury system.15  Women16 and African-Ameri-
cans17 were excluded from American juries for much of American history.
Those discriminatory practices, however, are now unconstitutional in the
United States.18  Currently, parties are entitled to a jury embodying a “fair
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Id. amend. VI.
10. Id. amend. VII.
11. See Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law
Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 1– 2 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000).
12. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 31 (“In contrast, England, Scotland, Wales, R
and Canada do not have as liberal a standard concerning trial by jury.  In those coun-
tries, persons accused of nonindictable crimes— less serious crimes for which the pre-
scribed punishment is less than two years in prison— do not have the right to trial by
jury.”).
13. Id.
14. A “venire” is the pool of prospective jurors from which the final jury is selected.
See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
15. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 51 (“The outright exclusion of women from R
juries in the United States was an inheritance of the English common law system.  In
England, women were excluded from juries until 1919.  Indeed, the famous legal scholar
Blackstone wrote in the 18th century that women were rightfully prohibited from jury
service because of what he labeled the defect of sex, which made them incapable of the
intelligent decision-making required for jury duty.”) (emphasis in original).
16. See, e.g., Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social
Science, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 1 (2005) (“Women were not permitted to
serve on juries for most of United States history.  As recently as 1961, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a state jury selection scheme that permitted women to serve on
juries only if they filed a written declaration expressing their desire to be eligible for
service.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Sanjay K. Chhablani, Re-Framing the ‘Fair Cross-Section’ Requirement, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 931, 935 (2011) (“[D]uring the antebellum period, blacks were
excluded from jury service in all southern and most northern states. . . . While some
African Americans apparently were permitted to serve on juries just prior to the Civil
War, for the most part the systematic exclusion of African Americans continued through
the years immediately following the Civil War.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
18. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527, 533– 34 (holding that defendants are entitled to
a “jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community” and holding that women
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cross section of the community.”19  However, likely due in part to jury pool
selection procedures, minorities continue to be underrepresented in many
American jury pools.20
The American judicial system values ensuring fair and diverse commu-
nity representation at the jury selection stages beyond simply the venire
stage.  Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky,21
attorneys are constitutionally forbidden from using peremptory challenges
based on race or gender.22  Despite the general consensus that challenges
to jurors should be race-neutral and gender-neutral, many scholars argue
that Batson and its progeny are ineffective in combating the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges.23
B. Lay Juries Around the World
Various countries around the world use some form of a lay jury sys-
tem.24  This includes numerous non-Anglo-Saxon countries, which have
instituted lay jury systems more recently.25  Notably, in most countries, the
use of lay juries to decide guilt and innocence in criminal cases is much
more frequent than the use of lay juries to determine fault and damages in
cannot be systematically excluded from a venire); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477-
78 (1990) (noting that defendants, irrespective of their racial group, are entitled to a fair
cross section jury venire without any racial group being excluded, but are not necessa-
rily entitled to a correspondingly proportional final jury).
19. See, e.g., Holland, 493 U.S. at 477.
20. See, e.g., Heather Davenport, Comment, Blinking Reality: Race and Criminal Jury
Selection in Light of Ovalle, Miller-El, and Johnson, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 949, 955– 56
(2006) (noting that facially-neutral methods of selecting a venire, such as using voter
registration or drivers’ license lists, often result in limiting minority representation in
American jury pools); Mark McGillis, Jury Venires: Eliminating the Discrimination Factor
by Using a Statistical Approach, 3 HOW. SCROLL: SOC. JUST. L. REV. 17, 21– 30 (1995)
(discussing examples of the discriminatory impact of certain venire selection
procedures).
21. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
22. See, e.g., id. at 79– 80 (“Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise
peremptory challenges for any reason, as long as that reason is related to his view con-
cerning the outcome of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assump-
tion that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s
case . . . .”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that “gen-
der, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.”);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in
the exercise of peremptory challenges.”).
23. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Over-
whelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1557 (2012) (arguing that “North Carolina trial courts
have not been especially willing to sustain Batson objections, and reviewing courts have
shown almost complete deference to those rulings.”); Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited,
97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1588, 1607– 10 (2012) (arguing that peremptory strikes limit the
effectiveness of Batson and should be eliminated).
24. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 275, 276 (2008).
25. Id. These countries include Argentina, Korea, Russia, and Spain. See id.
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civil cases.26
Countries differ both on questions of whether to have a lay jury sys-
tem and, if so, how to implement one.  Examples of countries without a lay
jury system include Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Mex-
ico, the Netherlands, and South Africa.27  Both Poland and Germany have a
mixed system where professional judges and lay assessors serve together.28
Australia, Brazil, Canada, England, Ireland, Scotland, and Spain, are coun-
tries where jurors deliberate and issue verdicts apart from the judgment of
professional judges.29  In Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Por-
tugal, laypersons and professional judges deliberate together.30  As British
colonialism spread, elements of the British jury system reached Africa, the
Mediterranean, Asia, the Caribbean, South America, and the South
Pacific.31
Given the fact that countries differ on whether or not to utilize lay jury
system, what are the advantages to adopting such a system in some coun-
tries but not in others?  Neil Vidmar noted in his survey of various jury
systems that “experience seems to indicate that jury systems often do not
operate well in multi-racial societies, particularly when the racial cleavages
are deep.”32  In his study of African jury systems published in the early
1960s, J.H. Jearey argued that implementation of a jury system may not be
fair to all citizens.33  Jearey found that the “system of trial by jury as devel-
oped in England can only work properly if three conditions are satis-
fied.”34  First, the society must be mostly homogeneous with respect to
race, culture, language, and religion.35  Second, members of society must
be sufficiently educated to set aside private prejudices in issuing a judg-
ment.36  Third, members of society must generally agree on what the law is
that they are enforcing.37 A fourth factor to consider is societal support for
citizen participation in the legal system and any historical use of a jury
26. See Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic
Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 629, 629 (2007).
27. Id. at 631– 32. The Czech and South African legal systems include some lay par-
ticipation, but not lay juries. See id. at 631 n.8, 632 n.14.
28. Id. at 633. Additionally, Japan and Venezuela both have mixed systems where
professional judges serve alongside lay assessors. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Valerie P. Hans,
The Future of Lay Adjudication in Korea and Japan, 3 YONSEI L.J. 1, 3, 8 (2012).
29. Leib, supra note 26, at 635– 37. R
30. Id. at 638– 41.
31. Neil Vidmar, Juries and Lay Assessors in the Commonwealth: A Contemporary Sur-
vey, 13 CRIM. L.F. 385, 385 (2002).
32. Id. at 404.
33. See J.H. Jearey, Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of Assessors in the Superior
Courts of British African Territories: I, 4 J. AFR. L. 133, 133 (1960) (“The existence of trial
by jury in [Africa] can be ascribed to one or other of two reasons. It is either a relic of
the enthusiasm for the jury which prevailed during the nineteenth century, or it is the
result of demands by European minorities in those territories where these minorities are
politically important.”).
34. J.H. Jearey, Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of Assessors in the Superior Courts
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within that society.38
Issues of internal conflict are not typically present in homogeneous
societies, and therefore, a good argument can be made that a jury is ideal
in most homogeneous societies.39  Richard Lempert cautions, however,
that because diversity of viewpoints in homogeneous societies is limited,
an American-style jury system may not be ideal in a homogeneous country
such as Japan.40  Therefore, any test looking at the necessity of a lay jury in
a heterogeneous society should probably be limited in application to only
heterogeneous societies.
II. Israeli Legal System and its Social Cleavages
A. Formation of the Israeli Court System
Similar to the American legal system, the Israeli legal system is based
on the British legal system.  Between World War I and the establishment of
the State of Israel in 1948, Great Britain controlled the British Mandate of
Palestine.41  As Justice Aharon Barak, former President of the Israeli
Supreme Court noted, “[t]he system of public law in Israel is based on the
foundations of English law, incorporated into the law of [Israel] during the
thirty years of the British mandate.”42  Israel has maintained the three-
tiered legal system established by Great Britain.43  The Magistrate Court is
the lowest court, the District Court is the intermediate court, and the
Supreme Court is the court of last resort.44  In Israel, there are currently
twenty-nine Magistrate Courts, five District Courts, and one Supreme
Court.45
The Israeli legal system departs from the legal systems in many other
democratic countries in a few respects.  First, Israel does not have a written
constitution to serve as a basis for its legal system.46  Second, the Israeli
38. See Lester W. Kiss, Reviving the Criminal Jury in Japan, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 261, 280 (Spring 1999) (“A fourth factor that Jearey does not mention that could
affect the success of a jury system is the degree to which a society has allowed or is
willing to allow citizen participation in the system.”).
39. See, e.g., id. at 283 (arguing that from a societal point of view, Japan, a homoge-
nous country, “is ripe for the reintroduction of the jury system.”).
40. See Richard Lempert, A Jury for Japan?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 42 (1992)  (noting
that Japan is much more ethnically homogenous than the United States, and arguing
that “in order to achieve the strengths which the jury system brings to the system of
justice in the United States, Japan may have to deviate somewhat from the structural
features of the United States’ jury system.”).
41. See, e.g., Shmuel Orenshtein & Michal Cohen, The Israeli Legal System and Cur-
rent Innovations in its Administration, EUR. INST. PUB. ADMIN., 1 (Apr. 2007), http://www.
eipa.eu/modules/EuroMedJustice/Conferences/Istanbul_16_19Apr07/reports/10_
Israel.pdf; MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL 35 (2011).
42. Aharon Barak, Foreword to PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, at vii (Itzhak Zamir & Allen
Zysblat eds.,  1996).
43. See Orenshtein & Cohen, supra note 41, at 1. R
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/Government/Branches%20of%20Government/Judicial/The%20Judiciary-
%20The%20Court%20System (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
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legal system lacks a lay jury.47  Instead, professional judges, appointed by a
judicial appointments committee, make determinations of both law and
fact.48  While one judge tries most cases, three-judge panels try serious
criminal cases.49  Additionally, three-judge panels preside over both crimi-
nal and civil appeals.50
B. Israeli Religious Courts
A unique aspect of the Israeli legal system is the presence of religious
courts.51  In fact, religious law plays a major role in the legal system.  In
Israel and in several other Middle Eastern countries emerging from Otto-
man rule, religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over family law.52
The Israeli religious courts emerged in the nineteenth century under Otto-
man rule and gained official recognition during the British Mandate.53
The Israeli government recognizes many religious communities: Jewish,
Muslim, Baha’i, and ten Christian denominations.54  The Knesset, the
Israeli national legislative body, has also recognized the Druze religious
community and has passed legislation to create Druze religious courts.55
After the establishment of Israel, religious courts continued to main-
tain complete authority over family law.56  Muslim religious courts main-
tain jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, and religious
identity.57  The Muslim courts follow Sharia law and have broader jurisdic-
tion over Israeli Muslims’ personal status issues than the Rabbinical courts
47. See, e.g., Amnon Straschnov, The Judicial System in Israel, 34 TULSA L.J. 527, 528
(1999).
48. Id. Straschnov offers two reasons to explain why Israel does not have a lay jury.
Id.  (“Initially it is believed impossible to find twelve people who do not know each
other, or the grandmother of the prosecutor, or the son-in-law of one of the witnesses.
Such familiarity among potential jurors makes the creation of an unbiased jury equally
impossible.  Additionally, and most importantly, one would be hard pressed to find
twelve Israelis who agree unanimously on a certain fact or point, let alone an entire
case.”).
49. Id.
50. Orenshtein & Cohen, supra note 41, at 2. R
51. The Judiciary, supra note 46. R
52. PATRICIA J. WOODS, JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONAL POLITICS: COURTS AND GENDER
IN THE RELIGIOUS-SECULAR CONFLICT IN ISRAEL 33 (Russell Stone ed., 2008).
53. Id. “The basic source for the application of the personal status law and the juris-
diction of the various religious courts is found in the Palestine Order in Council
(1922).” The Judiciary, supra note 46. R
54. See The Judiciary, supra note 46.  The Baha’i faith was founded in Iran in 1863. R
Baha’i at a Glance, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/bahai/ataglance/
glance.shtml (last updated Sept. 22, 2009).  The central concept of the faith is that peo-
ple should work together for the betterment of humanity. Id.
55. See The Judiciary, supra note 46.  The Druze community is an Arabic-speaking R
sect that recognizes all three monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism),
but it is secretive and closed to converts.  Naim Aridi, The Druze, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/druze.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2013).
56. See WOODS, supra note 52, at 36. R
57. Id. at 33.
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have over the personal status issues of Jews.58  Israeli Muslims can appeal
their cases to the Sharia Court of Appeals in Jerusalem, where a three-judge
panel hears the appeals.59  Rabbinical courts maintain control over mar-
riage and divorce.60  The Chief Rabbinical Council selects rabbis, called
dayyanim, to serve as judges in the Rabbinical courts.61  Despite a large
Jewish secular population, all Jewish citizens of Israel are subject to Hala-
cha, meaning Jewish law, regarding issues of marriage and divorce.62
C. Israeli Labour Courts
The major exception to the absence of lay participation in Israeli
courts is found in Israeli labour courts.63  In Israeli labour courts, lay per-
sons act as public representatives by serving on panels alongside profes-
sional judges.64  Regional Labour Court panels are composed of one
professional judge, one lay judge with experience in the labour sector, and
one lay judge with management experience.65  Generally, appeals are
heard by a panel of assessors at the National Labour Court in Jerusalem,
with panels composed of three professional judges, one lay judge from the
labour side, and one from the management side.66  Lay judges are
appointed by the Minister of Justice and Minister of Labour for three-year
terms, and the appointed lay judges have equal voting rights on the panel
to those of the professional assessors.67
D. Israeli Military Courts
In addition to Israeli religious courts and labour courts, Israel also has
separate military courts, which have been maintained in the West Bank
since 1967 and existed in the Gaza Strip from 1967 until 2005.68  As part
58. MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 77 (Kermit Hall &
David O’Brien eds., 1994).
59. Id. at 78.
60. Id. at 53.  Orthodox Judaism is the only State-recognized Jewish community in
Israel. Id. at 51.  By agreement with the state, Orthodox leadership has control over
kosher dietary laws, Sabbath observance, and the possibility for Jewish religious
schools. Id.
61. Id. at 53.
62. Id.
63. Peter Clark & Stephen Adler, Tenth Meeting of European Labour Court Judges: Lay
Judges Questionnaire, INT’L LAB. ORG., 1 (Sept. 2, 2002), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/@ed_dialogue/@dialogue/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_160097.
pdf. Labour courts have jurisdiction over worker-employer relations and disputes. See
SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 145 (2007).
64. RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 151 (Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr. ed., 2004).
65. Clark & Adler, supra note 63, at 2. R
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. at 2– 3.
68. EDELMAN, supra note 58, at 101. During the Six Day War in 1967, Israel captured R
the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt. See 1967:
Israel Launches Attack on Egypt, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/june/5/newsid_2654000/2654251.stm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). Nearly
500,000 Israeli citizens live in settlements located beyond Israel’s pre-1967 borders. See
Max Fisher, 9 Questions about Israel-Gaza You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask, WASH. POST
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of an interim peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), signed in September 1995, Israel transferred certain
governmental and legal powers over the West Bank to the Palestinian
Authority (PA), the organization that today governs much of the West
Bank.69  In Area A of the West Bank, the PA has control over civil govern-
ance and security matters; in Area B of the West Bank, the PA maintains
civil governance while the Israeli army is responsible for security matters;
and in Area C of the West Bank, which consists of Israeli civilian settle-
ments and Israeli military bases, the Israeli army maintains complete
authority.70
While Palestinian courts have jurisdiction over Palestinian civil and
criminal matters in the West Bank, Palestinians in the West Bank71 are
subject to Israeli military courts for security-related matters.72  However,
West Bank Israeli settlers charged in security-related matters are typically
tried in Israeli civil courts.73  Israeli law enables authorities to deny
detained individuals access to counsel for up to fifteen days, although
detainees must be permitted to meet an attorney “once [an] interrogation
is over.”74  Criminal defendants are entitled to defense counsel and may
petition the Israeli Supreme Court for appellate review.75
(Nov. 21, 2012, 7:00  AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/
2012/11/21/9-questions-about-israel-gaza-you-were-too-embarrassed-to-ask/.
The United States supports an Israeli withdrawal to Israel’s pre-1967 borders, assum-
ing that land swaps take into consideration the blocs of settlements near Israel’s pre-
1967 borders that contain most of the Israeli settlers. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Steven
Lee Myers, Obama Sees ‘67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20speech.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0; DAVID MAKOVSKY ET AL., IMAGINING THE BORDER: OPTIONS FOR RESOLV-
ING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TERRITORIAL ISSUE 1 (2011), available at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/StrategicReport06.pdf.  Israel with-
drew its military and its settlements from Gaza in 2005. See Fisher, supra.  Hamas, an
internationally recognized terrorist organization, now manages the Gaza Strip. Id.
69. See Sharon Weill, The Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli Military Courts in
the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 395, 401– 02 (2007), available at http://
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_weill.pdf.
70. Id. at 402.
71. This includes those Palestinians who live in Area A. See id.
72. EDELMAN, supra note 58, at 102.  Israeli military courts also have what amounts R
to de facto concurrent jurisdiction over all criminal matters in the West Bank. See id.
73. Id.  “Israeli citizens in the Administered Areas, like those residing in the State,
are also subject to the military courts for certain offenses, but in practice Israeli citizens
not on active military duty are rarely tried by the military courts.” Id.  After extremist
West Bank Israeli settlers attacked an Israeli military base, the Israeli Prime Minister
announced that Israeli extremists would be subject to military courts. See Ethan Bron-
ner, Israel Leader Sets Curbs on Settlers for Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/middleeast/netanyahu-sets-new-curbs-on-vio-
lent-settlers-in-israel.html.  However, despite the Prime Minister’s announcement, the
alleged attackers were not indicted in a military court, but rather were indicted in an
Israeli civil court in Jerusalem. See Isabel Kershner, Israel Charges 5 Settlers in West Bank
Army Base Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/
world/middleeast/israel-charges-5-settlers-in-clash-at-army-base.html.
74. EDELMAN, supra note 58, at 106. R
75. See id. at 103, 108.
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E. Liberal Tendencies of the Israeli Judiciary
The Israeli judiciary better protects the civil rights and liberties of
minorities than a lay jury would.  The Israeli Supreme Court has the
authority to review the actions of other Israeli courts, including the mili-
tary courts,76 and has garnered significant international prestige for its
active form of judicial review.77  During the term of Supreme Court Presi-
dent Justice Aharon Barak, the Israeli Supreme Court drew praise for pro-
tecting the civil rights and liberties of the disadvantaged in the areas of
torture and religious freedom, and for protecting the rights of Israeli-Arabs
to live in Jewish towns.78  For example, Justice Barak ordered that the
Israeli government hand out gas masks to Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.79  The Israeli Supreme
Court’s liberal use of its powers, despite Israel’s numerous security chal-
76. Id. at 102– 03.
77. See, e.g., DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1– 2 (Russell Stone ed., 2002); but see Jonathan
Cook, The Myth of Israel’s Liberal Supreme Court Exposed, MIDDLE EAST RES. AND INFO.
PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2012),  http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022312?ip_login_no_
cache=7a3540719c05834bcc77a0c9b6585458 (arguing that the Israeli Supreme Court,
particularly recently, has not taken liberal positions with regards to the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict).
Additional empirical research would be helpful in determining how successful the
Israeli judiciary is at protecting the civil rights and liberties of minority defendants,
particularly at the trial court level.  There are older studies suggesting some sentencing
discrepancies between minority and non-minority defendants, but these studies are a
few decades old and do not indicate the degree to which sentencing disparities are based
on judicial decision-making. See ARYE RATTNER & GIDEON FISHMAN, JUSTICE FOR ALL?
JEWS AND ARABS IN THE ISRAELI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9, 14– 21 (Simon Hakim ed.,
1998).  Additionally, non-discriminatory sentencing could reflect that judges are more
concerned with civil rights and liberties than is the Israeli public at-large. See infra note
84 and accompanying text. R
Empirical evidence in American criminal cases suggests that trial court judges are
more likely to acquit than juries. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So
Acquittal Prone?,  83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 152 (2005) (“Between 1989 and 2002, the
average conviction rate for federal criminal defendants was 84% in jury trials, but a
mere 55% in bench trials.”).
78. Emily Bazelon, Let There Be Law, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2002, http://www.legal
affairs.org/issues/May-June-2002/feature_bazelon_mayjun2002.html (“By taking the
side of suspected terrorists and defending the individual rights of Arabs and women, the
court has performed the classic judicial function of standing up for the disadvan-
taged.”).  Justice Barak revolutionized Israeli jurisprudence by using Basic Laws to pro-
tect the rights of minorities and by finding that the Israeli Knesset could not repeal Basic
Laws. See Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2007), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/enlightened-despot.  Justice Barak has, in essence, used
these Basic Laws as a constitution. Id.  Prior to Elena Kagan’s Senate confirmation hear-
ings, conservatives called attention to Kagan’s claim that Justice Barak was Kagan’s
“judicial hero,” a statement Kagan made while introducing Justice Barak at Harvard Law
School. See Stuart Taylor Jr., Kagan Blasted for Praising Liberal Israeli Judge, NEWSWEEK
(May 24, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/05/25/elena-
kagan-s-judicial-hero.html.
79. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praise for an Israeli Judge Drives Criticism of Kagan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25kagan.html;
but see Nimer Sultany, Note, The Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak: A Critical Review, 48
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 83, 83– 92 (2007) (arguing that Justice Barak did not sufficiently
protect the interests of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories).
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lenges, has led Israeli right-wing politicians and many within the Israeli
military establishment to deride the Israeli Supreme Court.80
An independent and liberal Israeli judicial system is necessary for sev-
eral reasons.  First, unlike the United States and many other Western
democracies, Israel does not have a written constitution to ensure all of the
protections and liberties that constitutions provide.81  Second, Israel is
governed by a unicameral legislature, the Knesset, and Israel’s government
lacks the checks and balances present in the United States.82  Third,
Israel’s executive branch is embedded in the Knesset; typically, the leader
of the largest party in the Knesset forms a governing coalition and serves
as Prime Minister.83  Given the structure of Israel’s government, the Israeli
judiciary serves as the only independent check on the Israeli governing
coalition.
There are several reasons why the Israeli Supreme Court has main-
tained its judicial independence and has been able to champion civil rights
and civil liberties.  First, the Israeli Bar Association and the Israeli judici-
ary are disproportionately left-leaning.84  Second, the Judicial Selection
Committee, responsible for appointing judges, is somewhat insulated from
the Knesset.85  Even when the Knesset is majority conservative, representa-
tion from the Israel Bar Association and the Israeli Supreme Court on the
80. KRETZMER, supra note 77, at 2.  In fact, in recent years, right-wing Israeli politi- R
cians have attempted to pass several pieces of legislation aimed at undermining the inde-
pendence of the Israeli Supreme Court.  Oren Majar, Peres: Israeli Right-Wing Bills are
‘Digression from Democracy’, HAARETZ (Nov. 15, 2011, 6:16 PM), http://
www.haaretz.com/news/national/peres-israeli-right-wing-bills-are-digression-from-
democracy-1.395774.
81. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
82. See Elise Garofalo, Israeli Election Primer — What You Should Know, PBS (Jan. 21,
2013, 5:50 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/01/israel-election-pri-
mer.html.  The United States has more checks and balances in its national government
than does Israel in its national government because the United States has a President
who is elected separately from the legislature, as well as a bicameral legislature. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2– 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
83. See Garofalo, supra note 82.  In 2009, Tzipi Livni, the leader of the largest party, R
was unable to form a governing coalition. See id.
84. See, e.g., Anshel Pfeffer, Netanyahu Against Vetting of Supreme Court Judges, JEW-
ISH CHRON. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.thejc.com/news/israel-news/58423/netany-
ahu-against-vetting-supreme-court-judges (noting that a “left-wing faction” currently
controls the Israeli Bar Association); Gil Ronen, Supreme Court “Gang” Heading Out, Says
Leading Journalist, ARUTZ SHEVA (June 11, 2011, 10:34 PM), http://www.israelnation-
alnews.com/News/News.aspx/144857#.UViSojn3A1g (noting that many of the Israeli
Supreme Court Justices are known as the “Rehavia Gang,” because they are left-leaning
and live in the upscale Jerusalem neighborhood of Rehavia); see also Bazelon, supra note
78 (“In contrast to politics, the institutions of the law— the courts, the major law schools, R
the Israel Bar Association— remain in the hands of the Ashkenazi elite, descended from
the group that founded Israel.  The most powerful group is identified with the secular,
upper-middle-class neighborhood of Rehavia in West Jerusalem . . . .”).
85. See David Nachmias, National Government Institutions, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR.
(Apr. 2009), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/isdf/text/nachmias.html (not-
ing that the Judicial Selection Committee is composed of nine members: the Minister of
Justice, an additional government minister, the president of the Supreme Court, two
other justices of the Supreme Court, two Knesset members, and two representatives of
the Israel Bar Association).
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Judicial Selection Committee has given left-leaning figures significant con-
trol over the selection of judges.86  This results in a Supreme Court pro-
tected from the political pressure of the Knesset.
F. Israel: A Deeply Divided Society
Different religious identities divide Israel’s population, and it is
unlikely that jury service would mitigate these cleavages.  While Israel
identifies as a Jewish State, Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy the same political
rights, including the right to vote, and the same social welfare benefits
granted to Israel’s Jewish citizens.87  Although jury service has been shown
to increase civic engagement among minorities in the United States,88 it
may not have as positive an impact among Israeli-Arabs.89  While overall
voter turnout dropped from 78.7% in the 1999 Knesset elections to 64.7%
in the 2009 Knesset elections,90 Israeli-Arab voter turnout has shown a
sharper decline, from 75% to 53.4%, over the same period.91  In addition
to voter turnout, Arab enlistment in the Israeli army is low and is evidence
of competing national identities.92  Druze and Jewish Israeli citizens face
compulsory service in the Israeli army or national service, but Israeli-
Arabs participate voluntarily and at a much lower rate.93
Although Israel’s Declaration of Independence grants Israeli-Arabs
equal rights,94 Israeli-Arabs face discrimination within Israeli society.  A
majority of Jewish Israeli citizens— 68%— view democracy to be at least as
important as the Jewishness of Israel.95  However, only 29% of Israeli Jews
and 20% of Israeli-Arabs believe there is full equality between Arab and
86. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note 84. R
87. See, e.g., Samuel Thrope, How Israel’s Arab Citizens Vote, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 27,
2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/27/how-israel-s-
arab-citizens-vote.html (noting that Israeli-Arabs account for approximately 20% of
Israel’s population and discussing voting trends among Israeli-Arab citizens in local and
national Israeli elections); Legal Status of East Jerusalem and its Residents, B’TSELEM (Jan.
1, 2013), http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status (noting that Palestinians living
in Israel are considered “permanent residents” who are granted social benefits and may
vote in local elections but may not vote in Knesset elections).
88. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. R
89. See infra notes 112– 118 and accompanying text. R
90. Israeli Elections: Voter Turnout, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/Politics/voting.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
91. Thrope, supra note 87. R
92. See Amy Teibel, National Service Proposal Riles Israeli Arabs, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 29, 2012, 5:21 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/national-service-proposal-riles-
israeli-arabs.
93. See id.
94. See Michael Mertes & Christiane Reves, Israel As A Jewish And Democratic State:
An Old Issue becomes a New Challenge, KAS INT’L REPS., 21, 21 (March 2012), http://
www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_30496-1522-2-30.pdf?120326140543 (“[Israel’s] charter spec-
ifies that Israel will ensure ‘complete equality of social and political rights to all its
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.’  It also appeals to the ‘Arab inhabitants
of the State of Israel to participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and
equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent
institutions.’”).
95. See Shibley Telhami & Steven Kull, Israeli Public Opinion after the November 2012
Gaza War, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
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Jewish citizens.96  Additionally, 56% of Israeli Jews and 43% of Israeli-
Arabs believe that while there is legal equality, institutional and societal
discrimination remains against Israeli-Arabs.97  In fact, a survey, con-
ducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in 2010, found that 46% of Israeli
Jews would not want to have Arabs as neighbors.98  In terms of identifica-
tion, many more Israeli-Arabs identify as Arab or Palestinian than identify
as Israeli.99
G. The Conflict Between Secular & Religious Jews
Even Israeli Jews are bitterly divided in terms of identity.  Disagree-
ments over the governing law are particularly strong between groups
within the Israeli Jewish population, and these disagreements undermine
attempts at uniform acceptance of the law.  In the late 1940s, Prime Minis-
ter David Ben-Gurion agreed to allow the small Ultra-Orthodox (“Haredi”)
Jewish population to be exempt from compulsory army service in order to
study traditional Jewish texts, but this decision has enflamed legal, policy,
and religious debates in recent years.100  The Haredim, once a small popu-
lation, now compose about 10% of Israel’s population.101  Haredi political
parties have historically used their political power as coalition partners to
prevent their constituents from being drafted.102  Many Israelis look down





98. Aviad Glickman, Survey: Half of Israeli Jews Oppose Having Arab Neighbors,
YNETNEWS (Nov. 30, 2010, 2:44 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3992058,00.html.
99. Shibley Telhami, Israeli Arab/Palestinian Public Opinion Survey, BROOKINGS INST.
(2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/12/09%20
israel%20public%20opinion%20telhami/israeli_arab_powerpoint.pdf (noting that of
600 surveyed Israeli Arabs and Palestinians, 36% identify as Arab, 22% identify as Pales-
tinian, 19% identify as Muslim, and only 12% identify as Israelis).
100. Jon Frosch, Israel’s Draft Expansion Reveals Deep Rifts, FR. 24 (July 13, 2012),
http://www.france24.com/en/20120712-israel-tsahal-knesset-ultra-orthodox-arab-
israeli-military-benjamin-netanyahu-army.
In 2012, the Israeli Supreme Court struck down the Tal Law, which exempted yeshiva
students from military service, as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Aviad Glickman, High
Court Rules Against Extending Tal Law, YNETNEWS (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:53 AM), http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4193034,00.html.
The Israeli government has yet to implement a procedure to achieve integration of the
Haredi community into the Israeli military and national service, although it has recently
created the Peri Committee to devise legislation on the matter. See, e.g., Yehuda Shlez-
inger, Haredi Leaders Claim Army, National Service is a ‘Calamity’, ISR. HAYOM (Apr. 24,
2013), http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=8835.
Prominent Haredi leaders have called on Haredim to resist any laws requiring military
enlistment. See Itzchak Tessler, Rabbi Says Call-Up Notices Must be Ignored, YNETNEWS
(Apr. 25, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4372235,00.
html.
101. Frosch, supra note 100. R
102. See Josef Federman, Israeli Coalition Formed, First In Decades to Exclude Ultra-
Orthodox Parties, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2013/03/15/israel-coalition_n_2883830.html.
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prioritizing Torah study over the country’s security.103  In fact, 23% of Jew-
ish Israelis believe that a member of the Haredi community would make
the worst neighbor.104
Many within the Haredi community believe that Jewish religious law,
or Halacha, should govern Israel.105  While 83.6% of young traditional,
secular Israeli Jews believe that Halacha should not prevail over democratic
principles, 85.4% of young Haredi and Orthodox Israelis believe that Hala-
cha should prevail over democratic principles.106  Haredi Israelis are not
alone in their willingness to follow messianic dogma at the expense of
democratic decision-making.  Many non-Haredi, Orthodox Jews support
disobeying government orders to evacuate settlements.107  More signifi-
cantly, many Haredim despise the Israeli secular courts and wish to have
them replaced with Halacha courts with jurisdiction over all matters.108
III. Why Israel Should Not Move Toward a Lay Jury System
A. Israeli Minorities’ Resistance to Civic Engagement
Israel is not suited to implement a lay jury system in part because
Israel’s minorities would likely be resistant to jury service.  A fundamental
aspect of the American jury system is the fair cross-section requirement,
which is aimed at achieving a diverse jury.109  In the United States, some
major reasons for empaneling a large and diverse jury are “to ensure a
diversity of viewpoints, to increase the likelihood that the jury will
represent all elements of the community, to promote group deliberation,
and to enhance the public’s acceptance of grand jury rulings.”110  There
are also civic benefits to jury service: studies of jurors in the United States
have found that jurors who reached a verdict in criminal trials were more
likely to participate in future United States elections.111
However, the deep divides among Israeli ethnic and religious groups
have made Israeli minorities resistant to civic engagement.  Theoretically,
103. See id.
104. See Glickman, supra note 98. R
105. Ruth Gavison, Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the “Ethnic Democracy”
Debate, 4 ISR. STUD. 44, 54 (1999).
106. Mertes & Reves, supra note 94, at 30. R
107. See, e.g., Amiram Barkat et al., Peace Now: Probe Rabbi’s Call to Disobey Evacua-
tion Orders, HAARETZ (Oct. 14, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/peace-
now-probe-rabbi-s-call-to-disobey-evacuation-orders-1.137362.
108. See NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, THEOCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR EXTREMISM 109 (2010) (“Much of the Haredi rage has been
directed at the Israeli legal system, especially– but not only– during the investigation,
trial, and punishment of Aryeh Deri from Shas.  Many Haredim view with scorn the
Israeli legal system because it is based on non-Jewish law principles.  Many law profes-
sionals have thus been exposed to animosity, threats, and attacks. Haredim have been
called upon repeatedly not to resort to the secular courts.  If the Haredim had their way,
Israel’s secular court system would have probably been replaced with a rabbinical one.”).
109. See supra notes 19, 21– 23 and accompanying text. R
110. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 721 (1995).
111. See, e.g., John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the
Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. POL. 351, 358– 60 (2008).
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minority groups in Israel might become more civically engaged after partic-
ipating in jury service.  A jury requirement, however, is unlikely to be suc-
cessful in any effort to increase civic engagement among Israeli-Arabs or
the Haredim because both groups have not taken advantage of alternative
opportunities for civic engagement through voluntary army service or
national civilian service, and because Israeli minority groups do not iden-
tify strongly with their country.112  Despite the fact that army or national
service is mandatory for most Israelis, Israeli-Arabs and Haredi Israelis
have not agreed to compulsory army or national service.113  Such service
would be an opportunity for Israeli-Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews to more
fully participate in Israeli society.  Additionally, the rate of Israeli-Arab par-
ticipation in national elections is decreasing.  Roughly 22% fewer Israeli-
Arabs voted in the 2009 Knesset elections than voted in the 1999 Knesset
elections.114
The problems causing a lack of Israeli-Arab participation in Israeli
civic life run much deeper than a lack of opportunity for participation.
Much of the decrease in Israeli-Arab voting follows the Second Intifada, the
2000 uprising of Palestinians against Israel.115  Discrimination and a lack
of identification with the Jewish state negatively impact Israeli-Arab enthu-
siasm for Israel.116  The lack of identification with Israel among Israeli-
Arabs117 contrasts with the relatively stronger sense of American identity
felt amongst minority and immigrant groups in America.118  Therefore,
112. See supra notes 92– 93, 99 and accompanying text. R
113. See supra notes 92– 93, 100, 103 and accompanying text. R
114. See supra notes 90– 91 and accompanying text. R
115. See Seth Freedman, The Second Intifada, 10 Years on, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2010,
4:30 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/01/israel-palestine-
intifada-10-years-on; see also Nadim Rouhana et al., Voting without Voice: About the Vote of
the Palestinian Minority in the 16th Knesset Elections, in THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL— 2003
217, 236 (Asher Arian & Michal Shamir eds., 2005) (noting that an Israeli-Arab shift
from voting for Zionist parties in the early 1990s to voting for non-Zionist parties in the
early 2000s may be evidence of Israeli-Arabs’ lack of identification with Israel).
116. See Rouhana et al., supra note 115; see also supra notes 96– 99 and accompanying R
text.
117. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. R
118. See, e.g., David Seminara, New Poll: Latino Voters Identify as Americans First and
Don’t Vote on the Immigration Issue, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://
www.cis.org/seminara/new-poll-latino-voters-identify-americans-first-and-dont-vote-
immigration-issue (“74 percent of Latinos told pollsters that they identified as being
American, with only 19 percent stating that they identified themselves as both American
and Latino, and 4 percent claiming that they identified more with their country of origin
than the United States.”); Second-Generation Americans: A Portrait of the Adult Children of
Immigrants, PEW RES. CENTER (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/
07/second-generation-americans (“[R]oughly six-in-ten adults in the second generation
consider themselves to be “typical American,” about double the share of immigrants who
say the same. . . . About half of second-generation Latinos (52%) and about two-thirds of
Asian Americans (64%) say their group gets along well with all other major racial and
ethnic groups in America; smaller shares of Latino (26%) and Asian-American (49%)
immigrants say the same.”); Proud Patriots –  and Harsh Critics of Government, PEW RES.
CENTER (July 1, 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/07/01/proud-patriots-and-
harsh-critics-of-government (noting that 36% of African-Americans are “extremely
proud” to be Americans and 45% are “very proud”).
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while both the United States and Israel are heterogeneous countries, minor-
ities in the United States identify much more strongly with the United
States than Israeli-Arabs identify with Israel.  Given Israeli-Arabs’ lack of
identity with Israel, Israeli-Arabs would likely resist a jury service
requirement.
There are also concerns regarding the practicability of a jury service
requirement among Haredi Israelis.  For many Haredim, Torah study and
adherence to Halacha law are more important than service to the State of
Israel.119  Haredim believe in separation between women and men and
hold many misogynistic views.120  Given their use of religion to avoid mili-
tary service and disdain for the Israeli secular courts, it is unlikely that
Haredim would be willing to serve on a jury.121  And given their views on
women,122 it is even less likely that a court could obtain unbiased Haredi
jurors.  Additionally, even if selected, Haredi jurors might be unwilling to
agree to adhere to Israeli law over religious law.123
B. Israeli Bias Against Minorities Would Cause Unfairness
Discrimination against minorities makes selecting an unbiased jury in
Israel almost unfeasible.  Engagement in armed conflict has caused bias in
many democracies, including the United States.  Examples include the
political repression of those associated with Communism during the Red
Scare and McCarthyism124 and the internment of Japanese Americans dur-
119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. R
120. See Catrina Stewart, Sexism and the State of Israel, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/sexism-and-the-state-of-israel-
6287448.html.
121. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text. R
While it may be difficult to obtain a complete cross-section of the Haredi population,
having Haredi jurors in criminal cases involving Haredi defendants could add some
legitimacy to the legal system.  During the twelfth century, England created mixed juries
in cases involving a party from the minority community. See Deborah A. Ramirez, A
Brief Historical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213, 1214
(1994); see also Peter J. Richards, Note, The Discreet Charm of the Mixed Jury: The Episte-
mology of Jury Selection and the Perils of Post-Modernism, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 445, 461
(2003) (“These mixed juries, or juries ‘of half-tongue,’ seem to promise a historically-
informed alternative perspective on the problems posed by the potentially explosive
combination of minority over-representation in the class of criminal defendants, and
under-representation on jury panels.”).
122. It is possible that some Haredi men would outright refuse to sit on a jury with
women, particularly if forced to sit adjacent to a female juror. See, e.g., Mordechai I.
Twersky, Ultra-Orthodox Jews Increasingly Refuse to Sit Near women on El Al flights,
HAARETZ (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:07 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/anglo-file/ultra-
orthodox-jews-increasingly-refuse-to-sit-near-women-on-el-al-flights-1.420298 (discuss-
ing trend of Haredi male airplane passengers asking female passengers to switch seats so
that men can sit near men, and women near women).
123. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text. R
124. See, e.g., REGIN SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1919-1943 30 (2000) (noting that works written about the Red Scare
during the era of McCarthyism were colored by views held during the era of
McCarthyism).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN104.txt unknown Seq: 17 29-MAY-14 11:28
2014 A Jury for Israel? 137
ing World War II.125  Israel has been at war with many of its Arab neigh-
bors since Israel’s founding, and as a result, there is bias among Israel’s
Jewish population against Arabs.126
Israel’s Jewish population is also biased against the Haredim.127  In
fact, the battle over the future of Israel between the secular Jewish popula-
tion and the Haredi population has been likened to a “civil war.”128  Given
these realities, members of the secular Jewish population selected for jury
service are likely to be biased against the Israeli-Arab and Haredi
populations.
C. Adherence to What Law?
It is unclear whether all Israelis would adhere to one set of laws.  Israel
does not have a written constitution, though the Israeli Supreme Court
applies the Basic Laws129 to provide some protection of civil liberties.130
More importantly, it is unclear what law Israeli jurors would follow.
Although Israel has a written Criminal Code,131 would jurors follow Hala-
cha, common law, or some combination?  This question would need to be
answered before instituting a jury system.
There is also a risk of juries discriminatorily nullifying criminal activ-
ity.  According to Professor Doug Linder, “[j]ury nullification occurs when
a jury returns a verdict of ‘Not Guilty’ despite its belief that the defendant is
guilty of the violation charged.  The jury in effect nullifies a law that it
believes is either immoral or wrongly applied . . . .”132  Nullifications may
be particularly concerning if caused by discrimination, especially against
minority groups.133  Given the negative views many Israelis have of Israeli-
125. See, e.g., Children of the Camps: Internment History, PBS (1999), http://
www.pbs.org/childofcamp/history/.
126. See Glickman supra note 98 and accompanying text. R
127. See supra notes 103, 104 and accompanying text. R
128. See, e.g., Erica Brown, Fight with Haredi a Civil War No One Wants, JEWISH CHRON.
(Jan. 15, 2012, 11:43 AM), http://thejewishchronicle.net/view/full_story/17162023/
article-Fight-with-Haredi-a-civil-war-no-one-wants-?instance=news_special_coverage_
right_column.
129. Instead of a constitution, the Israeli Knesset has passed so-called “Basic Laws”
that set the political and legal framework for Israel and are arguably constitutionally
superior to most legislation that is passed by the Knesset. Basic Laws - Introduction,
KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2013).  The Knesset has passed fourteen such Basic Laws. The Existing
Basic Laws: Full Texts, KNESSET, http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mim-
shal_yesod1.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
130. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
131. See Emily Silverman, Section Israel, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN AND INT’L
CRIM. L., http://www.mpicc.de/ww/en/pub/organisation/wissenschaft/referat/laender-
referate/naher_osten/israel.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 2013).
132. Doug Linder, Jury Nullification, U. MO. KAN. CITY (2001), http://law2.umkc.edu/
faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html.
133. Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 304 (1996)
(“The second erroneous assumption, and by far the most troubling, is that when juries
nullify they do so out of compassion or a desire to be lenient, rather than for illegitimate
reasons.  For every case where the jury extends mercy to a deserving defendant, there
may well be another (or two, or five others) where the verdict is based on improper
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Arabs and Haredim, it is quite possible that discriminatory nullification
would take place in cases where there is an Israeli-Arab or Haredi party
involved.  For example, an Israeli jury hearing a case regarding a “price tag”
vandalism attack against an Israeli-Arab or a Haredi Israeli could be biased,
and could use such bias to nullify what would otherwise be a guilty verdict
against the perpetrator.134  Such a result would be contrary to the goal of a
legal system that protects minorities and other vulnerable populations.135
Nullification based on religious belief is an additional concern.  Mater-
ials published by religious groups in the United States reveal reason to sus-
pect that religious beliefs could factor into verdicts arrived at by religiously
ardent jurors.136  The same danger could be present in Israel, where jurors
could nullify a verdict for violation of a law where the law conflicts with a
religious belief.137
D. The Current System is Preferable
Israel’s minorities are currently protected in Israel’s judicial system,
even though Israel does not have a lay jury system.  The Israeli judiciary
has a reputation for protecting civil liberties, despite the Israeli-Arab con-
flict, and despite the discriminatory views held by many Israelis.138  The
Israeli judiciary has been able to maintain this reputation, even though
considerations.  The archetypical case occurs when the acquittal is based on race or
ethnicity: either the jury is prejudiced against a victim (e.g., the victim was African
American, and jurors considered the harm done by the crime less than if the victim were
white) or biased in favor of a defendant because of race.”).
134. A “price tag” attack is a retaliatory act carried out by right-wing Israeli Jewish
activists against Israeli-Arabs or Haredim See, e.g., Michael Omer-Man, ‘88% of Jewish
Israelis Oppose Price Tag Attacks’, JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/National-
News/88-percent-of-Jewish-Israelis-oppose-price-tag-attacks (last updated Nov. 10, 2011,
7:45 PM) Polls on what percentage of Jewish Israelis support “price tag” attacks are
mixed. See id.  (finding that 88% of Jewish Israelis oppose “price tag” attacks); Poll: 46%
in Favor of ‘Price Tag’, YNETNEWS (Mar. 28, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://www.ynetnews.com/
articles/0,7340,L-4048459,00.html (finding that 46% of Jewish Israelis believed “price
tag” attacks were somewhat justified following the murder of a family in the Israeli set-
tlement of Itamar).
135. See supra notes 129– 130 and accompanying text. R
136. See, e.g., Don Boys, Should Christian Jurors Disregard Judges’ Instructions?,
CSTNEWS (June 19, 2006), http://www.cstnews.com/bm/social-issues-facing-christians-
common-sense-for-today/criminal-justice-and-common-sense/should-christian-jurors-
disregard-judges-instructi.shtml (arguing that jury nullification by Christians “is the
very last blow the average citizen can strike at tyranny.”); Should a Christian Serve on a
Jury (Matthew 7:1)?, CHURCH OF THE GREAT GOD, http://www.cgg.org/index.cfm/fuseac-
tion/Library.sr/CT/BQA/k/152/Should-Christian-Serve-on-Jury-Matthew-71.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2013) (arguing that Christians should not serve on juries because the
Bible “teaches that Christians should not involve themselves in judging others.”); The
Citizen’s Rule Book, AM. PATRIOT FRIENDS NETWORK, http://www.apfn.org/pdf/citizen.pdf
(last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (promoting a right to jury nullification founded in the bible).
137. See, e.g., Jeremy Sharon, Police Arrest Women of the Wall Leader for Singing, JERU-
SALEM POST (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-Features/
Police-arrest-Women-of-the-Wall-leader-for-singing (noting that the leader of the Women
of the Wall activist group was arrested for violating a law prohibiting singing aloud at
the Western Wall).
138. See supra notes 78– 80, 84– 86 and accompanying text. R
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minorities are relatively under-represented in the Israeli bar and in the
Israeli judiciary.139  At the end of 2008, 15.5% of Israeli lawyers, and 7%
of Israeli judges were Arab.140  In 2004, Salim Joubran became the first
Israeli-Arab to be appointed to the Israeli Supreme Court.141  There is little
data available on Haredi-Israeli membership of the Israeli bar and the
Israeli judiciary, but given the general disdain for the secular courts held
by the Haredim, Haredi-Israelis are likely under-represented in both the
Israeli bar and among the Israeli judiciary.142
While minorities are underrepresented within the Israeli judicial sys-
tem, the liberal-leaning nature of the Israeli Bar Association provides better
protection against discrimination for Israel’s minority populations in crim-
inal matters than would instituting a lay jury system.  This is particularly
true given the difficulties faced in assembling an unbiased jury that fairly
represents Israel’s diverse population and that agrees as to the content of
the law that should be applied.143  Additionally, Israel’s minorities are pro-
tected from discrimination in personal and family matters through the vast
jurisdiction of the religious courts.144
Additionally, though a jury system is beneficial for many countries, a
jury system is not likely to be beneficial for Israel.  A jury system is benefi-
cial because it can add to the perceived legitimacy of a legal framework.145
Additionally, a jury system can promote civic engagement and political
participation.146  Further, a jury system is likely to promote the perception
that the legal framework is fair.147  At present, a jury in Israel is unlikely to
promote civic engagement and political participation,148 and is unlikely to
promote fairness.149  However, a jury system could ultimately help legiti-
mate the legal framework by increasing the inclusion of minority groups in
the deliberation process.
139. See Ali Haider, Appoint Arab judges, HAARETZ (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.sikkuy.
org.il/english/docs/haaretz_haider_14_9_09.pdf.
140. Id. The number of Israeli-Arab lawyers and judges in the Israeli judiciary is not
proportionate to the number of Israeli-Arabs in the Israeli population. Id.
141. See Greg Myre, World Briefing: Middle East: Israel: Supreme Court Gains First
Arab, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/07/world/world-
briefing-middle-east-israel-supreme-court-gains-first-arab.html.
142. See BEN-YEHUDA supra note 108. R
143. See supra Part III.A– C.
144. See supra notes 56– 62 and accompanying text. R
145. See, e.g., John Gastil et al., Deliberation and Global Criminal Justice: Juries in the
International Criminal Court, 24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 69, 70 (2010) (arguing that under
certain circumstances, a jury in the International Criminal Court’s cases “could contrib-
ute significantly to the perceived legitimacy of the Court’s decisions and to its function
as a legal institution”).
146. See, e.g., JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 9-11 (2010) (arguing that lay
juries promote civic engagement and political participation).
147. See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 513 (2012) (“Many characterize the American jury system as
maximizing fairness, urging that it allows a group of representative citizens to adjudicate
disputes rather than allowing the state to run rampant.”).
148. See supra Part III.A.
149. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. Juries in Heterogeneous Societies
A. A Test to Determine the Feasibility of a Jury System in Israel
In Section I, this Note discussed a four-factor test for determining
whether a lay jury is desirable in a particular society.150  Israel likely fails
the first factor: having a population that is mostly racially, culturally, lin-
guistically, and religiously homogeneous.151  Most Israelis are Jewish152
and speak Hebrew.153  However, there is a significant Arab population that
speaks Arabic and is mostly either religiously Muslim or Christian.154
Israel likely fails the second factor as well, which requires having a popula-
tion sufficiently educated to set aside prejudices prior to reaching a judg-
ment.155  While Israelis are relatively highly educated,156 a substantial
number of Israelis still maintain discriminatory views.157  For the third fac-
tor— juror agreement on the type of law that society ought to enforce158—
Israelis do not have a constitution, have not agreed on what type of law the
country should be enforcing, and it is unclear how much impact religion
would have on juror decision-making.159  With regard to the fourth factor
of societal support for a lay jury and the historical use of a lay jury,160
there is no history in Israel of a jury system, and there is no evidence to
suggest societal support for a shift toward a lay jury system.161  Israel,
therefore, fails all four factors of the test proposed in Section I.
While the previously discussed four-factor test may be a useful start-
ing point for judging the feasibility of a jury system in homogenous coun-
tries162 a condensed and simplified version of the test is more appropriate
for application in heterogeneous countries.  It is argued that before a heter-
ogeneous country institutes a lay jury system, two factors must be present:
(1) The vast majority of citizens must have a common national identity;
and (2) the society must agree on a common set of laws to be employed.
This new test combines many of the aspects of the previously discussed
four-factor test, but with some significant modifications.
150. See supra notes 34– 38 and accompanying text. R
151. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. R
152. 65th Independence Day –  More than 8 Million Residents in the State of Israel, CENT.
BUREAU OF STAT. (Apr. 14, 2013), http://www1.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2013n/11_13_
097e.pdf.
153. PEOPLE: Minority Communities, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://mfa.gov.il/
MFA/AboutIsrael/People/Pages/SOCIETY-%20Minority%20Communities.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan 10, 2014).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. R
156. See, e.g., OECD: Israel Among World’s Most Highly Educated Countries, JERUSALEM
POST, http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/OECD-Israel-among-worlds-most-highly-
educated-countries (last updated Feb. 1, 2012, 7:16 PM) (noting that the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development found Israel to be among the most highly
educated countries in the world, particularly at the post-secondary education level).
157. See supra notes 94– 98, 103– 104, 126– 128 and accompanying text. R
158. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. R
159. See supra Part III.C.
160. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. R
161. See Straschnov, supra note 47 and accompanying text. R
162. See supra notes 35, 38– 39 and accompanying text. R
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In terms of the first factor in the new test, having a common national
identity is far more important than the other sorts of cleavages that can
divide a society.  There are countries, such as the United States, that main-
tain respected jury systems despite not being racially, culturally, linguisti-
cally, and religiously homogeneous.163  However, differing national
identities in other heterogeneous countries, such as Israel, prevent a lay
jury system from being viable.  Currently, Israel is divided not only by dif-
ferences in national identity between the Jewish majority and Arab minor-
ity, but also by differences within the Jewish majority between secular Jews
and the Haredim.164
With regard to the second factor in the test, having an agreed upon
source of law solves many of the concerns addressed in the previously dis-
cussed four-factor test.  Having an agreed upon a source of law would
encourage education about legal rights and liberties.  Additionally, having
a societal consensus on the source of law could boost societal support for
lay participation in the legal system.165
The United States passes this new test because even despite some
racial and cultural differences, United States citizens have a common
national identity,166  and because the United States has a written constitu-
tion granting all citizens equal rights.167  In the United States, the Consti-
tution is the law of the land,168 and in fact, new American citizens must
take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America and to the United
States Constitution.169
Israel, however, would fail both factors of this test.  There is a signifi-
cant minority of Israelis who do not identify as Israelis,170 and many
Haredim want Israel to become a Halachic state.171  Furthermore, Israel
does not have a universally recognized constitution to serve as the central
source of law and protection for all Israelis.172
B. Further Complications to the Potential for a Jury in Israel
Before Israel can add a jury, Israelis must agree on what law should be
employed.173  It is impractical for Israel to have secular criminal law if
much of the population will ignore it based on religious beliefs.174  A writ-
163. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. R
164. See supra notes 94– 99, 105– 108 and accompanying text. R
165. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. Id. art. VI.
169. See Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America, U.S. CITIZEN-




170. See Telhami, supra note 99 and accompanying text. R
171. See supra notes 105– 108 and accompanying text. R
172. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. R
173. See supra Part III.C.
174. See supra notes 136– 137 and accompanying text. R
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ten constitution defining what it means to be a Jewish state could go a long
way toward solving this problem.  Would such a state simply be a secular
state with a Jewish majority, or would Judaism play a substantial role in
Israeli jurisprudence?  Such a decision should be specified in Israel’s con-
stitution.  It is also important for any Israeli constitution to address how
Israel can define itself as a state with a Jewish majority, but still protect the
rights of minority groups.  Addressing this concern could help Israeli
minorities identify more with Israel.
The Israel-Arab conflict likely undermines Israel’s ability to have a
jury system by making it especially difficult to create a common national
identity.  Israel’s inability to determine its borders threatens its future as a
Jewish, democratic state.  While Palestinians in the West Bank are gov-
erned by and vote in Palestinian Authority elections,175 Israeli settlers who
live in the West Bank are governed by and vote in Israeli elections.176  If
Palestinians were to abandon calls for the creation of a Palestinian state
encompassing the West Bank (and Gaza), and were instead to demand the
right to vote in Israel, Israel would soon cease to be a majority-Jewish
state.177  Such a situation would further complicate any attempt at achiev-
ing a common national identity among Israelis.
Currently, the existence of a Palestinian state would be beneficial for
Israel.  In addition to any security and demographic benefits that a Pales-
tinian state would bring, it could also provide Israeli-Arabs who do not
identify with Israel a homeland with which to identify.178  If the people
who are currently considered Israeli-Arabs had two homelands to choose
from, it is quite possible that tensions between Israelis and Israeli-Arabs
would be mitigated and a unifying Israeli identity could be formed that
includes Israeli minority groups.
C. A Jury in the Future?
Israel’s lack of a jury is not ideal.  Without a jury system, Israel is
prone to criticisms that its judicial system lacks legitimacy.179  However,
without major changes, the current absence of a lay jury is preferable to the
addition of a lay jury.180
175. See, e.g., Noah Browning, West Bank Vote Held to Help Plug Palestinian Democracy
Gap, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2012, 9:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/20/
us-palestinians-elections-idUSBRE89J07T20121020.
176. See, e.g., Ori Nir, Who Did the Jewish Settlers Vote For, FORWARD (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://forward.com/articles/170754/who-did-the-jewish-settlers-vote-for/?p=all.
177. See, e.g., Jeffrey Goldberg, How Palestinians Can Finally Achieve Independence,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-26/how-pales-
tinians-can-finally-achieve-independence.html?alcmpid=view (arguing that if Palestini-
ans voted in Israeli elections, as opposed to in Palestinian elections, Israel would quickly
become an Arab-majority state).
178. See Livni: National aspirations of Israel’s Arabs Can be Met by Palestinian Home-
land, HAARETZ (Dec. 11, 2008, 2:06 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/livni-national-
aspirations-of-israel-s-arabs-can-be-met-by-palestinian-homeland-1.259321.
179. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. R
180. See supra Part III.D.
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Under the right circumstances, however, a jury system would be pref-
erable to the status quo.  If Israelis were able to unite around a common
national identity and a common source of law, a lay jury system would add
legitimacy to Israel’s legal system and could increase civic engagement.
Such a system would have to involve a fair cross-section of the population,
including Israel’s Arab and Haredi populations.  If Israel can integrate
minority groups sufficiently to create a common national identity, Israel
would pass the first part of the two-part test suggested in Section A of Part
IV of this Note.181  If Israel can reach a consensus among all Israelis on the
source of law, Israel could accomplish better protection of minorities’
rights, and could also pass the second prong of the test.182  If Israel is able
to pass both parts of the test, lay participation in jury service could also
add to the legitimacy of the Israeli legal system, as well as increase civic
engagement.183
Conclusion
In the United States, the right to a trial by jury in serious criminal
cases and in many civil cases is a fundamental right.  The trial by jury is
also common in many Western countries, particularly those with Anglo-
Saxon roots.  More and more countries have added lay juries in recent
years.  However, Israel, a country with Anglo and Ottoman roots, has not
yet added a jury system.  An important question is whether and under what
circumstances a heterogeneous society such as Israel should have a lay
jury.
This Note argued that Israel should not presently institute a lay jury
system.  This Note analyzed an existing four-factor test for determining
whether a society should have a lay jury.  This pre-existing test is useful,
but should be modified and condensed into a two-part test for application
to heterogeneous societies: First, in order to institute a jury, the vast major-
ity of citizens must have a common national identity.  Second, there must
be an agreed upon source of law.
At present, Israel fails both parts of this new test.  First, Israeli society
is sharply divided between the majority who identify with Israel, and a
significant minority who either identify as Palestinian Arabs, or identify as
followers of Halachic Judaism.  Second, not all Israelis have agreed upon a
common source of law.  However, a lay jury system may be ideal once
Israel meets these two conditions.  In addition to its application to Israel,
the two-part test can be applied to other heterogeneous countries to deter-
mine the feasibility of a lay jury system.
181. The first part of the test is that the vast majority of citizens must have a common
national identity.
182. The second part of the test is that society must agree on a common set of laws to
be employed.
183. See supra notes 145– 146 and accompanying text. R
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